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[Abstract] Ransomware is a rapidly growing threat to the data files of individuals and businesses. It 
encrypts files on an infected computer and holds the key to decrypt the files until the victim pays a ransom. 
This malware is responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars of losses annually. Due to the large amounts 
of money to be made, new versions appear frequently. This allows bypassing antivirus software and other 
intrusion detection methods. In this paper, we present a brief history of ransomware, the arguments for and 
against paying the ransom, best practices to prevent an infection, and to recover from an infection should 
one happen.
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Overview of Ransomware
Ransomware is malware that locks your computer or prevents you from accessing your data using private 
key encryption until you pay a ransom. That ransom is usually paid in Bitcoin. Data based extortion has 
been around since about 2005 but the development of ransom encryption software and Bitcoins have greatly 
facilitated the scheme (Zetter, 2015).
While ransomware attacks on personal computers are the stories that generally make the news, 
ransomware have also been developed to attack mobile phones by changing the PIN number of the device 
and then requiring a ransom to obtain the new PIN (Zetter, 2015). Ransomware is big business. The 
computer security firm Symantec conservatively estimates that ransomware extorts hundreds of 
millions from victims each year. Symantec also notes that paying the ransom is no guarantee that the 
decryption key will be provided and, in many cases, it is not (Zetter, 2015).
Ransomware can be divided into two basic types. The most common is crypto ransomware, which 
encrypts files and data. The second type is locker ransomware. This version locks the computer or other 
device, preventing the victims from using it (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015). Locker ransomware only locks 
the device; the data stored on the device is typically untouched. As a result, if the malware is removed, the 
data is untouched. Even if the malware cannot be easily removed, the data can often be recovered by moving 
the storage device, typically a hard drive, to another functioning computer. This makes locker ransomware 
much less effective in extorting ransom payments (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Crypto ransomware, on the other hand, encrypts the data, so even if the malware is removed from the 
device or the storage media is moved to another device, the data is not accessible. Typically, crypto 
ransomware does not target critical system files, enabling the device to continue to function in spite of being 
infected—after all, the device could be needed to pay the ransom (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015). 
In late 90’s and up until 2005, online payment methods were not so readily available. Victims were 
instructed to pay ransoms via SMS text messages or by mailing pre-paid cards. Another common payment 
method was having the victim call a premium rate telephone number that earned money for the attacker 
(Zetter, 2015).
All of these payment methods were risky, since a determined investigator could trace them back to the 
attacker. Ransomware really took off when in 2008 Bitcoin came into use. Bitcoin is electronic currency 
that is much harder to trace and thus helped anonymize the transactions. That made it difficult or even 
impossible to track the attacker by following the payment (Rosenberg, 2015). While Bitcoins have the 
advantage of being difficult to impossible to trace, they do have risks. The two major risks are massive 
exchange rate swings and hacking of major Bitcoin exchanges (Savage, 2015).
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In general, crypto ransomware prefers Bitcoin, while locker ransomware prefers payment voucher systems. 
That makes sense: the infected computer remains fully functional after a crypto ransomware infection, so 
the user is free to use the computer to purchase Bitcoins. With locker ransomware, the computer is locked 
and, therefore, unusable, making the purchase of Bitcoins more difficult. It is therefore easier for the victim 
to buy payment vouchers locally and enter a payment code (Savage, 2015).
Ultimately, the criminals need to convert the ransomware they receive into cash they can spend. The 
methods used to laundry the ransom depend on the type of ransomware. Locking ransomware, which tend 
to use payment voucher systems, use online betting services in a variety of legal jurisdictions that accept 
the voucher codes as payment. The money is then transferred to prepaid debit cards and “money mules” are 
used to withdraw cash (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015). Payments in Bitcoin can be used directly due to the 
privacy of cryptocurrency. However, many criminals are worried about law enforcement. As a result, a 
number of Bitcoin-laundering services have become available for criminals to use. There are also Bitcoin 
anonymizers that criminals can use (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Evolution of Ransomware
The following timeline was created with approximate dates based on what is known about the ransomware. 
Due to the illegality of ransomware, the authors fully expect that details are missing. Nevertheless, it does 
show the general evolution and growth of ransomware over time. It is also important to note that sources 
are not consistent in the names used for the various versions of ransomware, though they do tend to be 
similar.
1989. The first ransomware virus, called the AIDS Trojan (and also known as the PC Cyborg), was 
created by Joseph L. Popp. Popp was a Harvard-trained evolutionary biologist. It was distributed by floppy 
disk at the World Health Organization’s International Aids conference. It used simple symmetric 
cryptography to encrypt file names and tools were soon available to decrypt them (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
2005. The first modern ransomware was Trojan.Gpcoder, also known as GP Code and GPCoder. It was 
released in May 2005 and initially used a custom symmetric encryption technique that was weak and easily 
overcome. Its authors continued to improve the malware (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015). Trojan.Gpcoder 
was spread via a spam email attachment claiming to be a job application (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
The bulk of the early ransomware was developed in Russia by Russian organized criminals. It was 
mostly aimed at Russian victims and those in neighboring countries, like Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
(Cawley, 2016).
2006. In early 2006, ransomware was starting to gain traction, and more attackers started to try their 
hand. Trojan.Cryzip appeared in March 2006. It copied data files to password-protected archive files and 
deleted the originals. The code for the malware included the password, so recovering it was straightforward.
Trojan.Archiveus also came on the scene in 2006. It operated much like Trojan.Cryzip, except instead 
of asking for a ransom, it required victims to buy medication from specific online pharmacies and submit 
the order ID to get the password (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
2007. Locker ransomware began to appear. Early versions struck Russia and displayed a pornographic 
image on the machine and demanded payment to remove it, either by SMS text message or calling a 
premium-rate phone number. Attacks soon spread to Europe and the US (Zetter, 2015).
2008. A variant of Trojan.Gpcoder called GPcode.AK first appeared. It used a 1024-bit RSA key. It 
left a text file with instructions in each subdirectory where it encrypted files. It asked for payment of $100 
to $200 in e-gold or Liberty Reserve (Tromer, 2008).
2011. Mid 2011 saw the first large-scale outbreak of ransomware, mainly due to emerging anonymous 
payment services. There were about 30,000 new ransomware samples in quarter one and another 30,000 in 
quarter two. By quarter three, there were 60,000 new samples (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
2012. A toolkit called Citadel was released at a cost of about $3,000. Citadel made it simple to produce 
and distribute ransomware (Segura, 2016).  Another toolkit, called Lyposit, also came out in 2012. It was 
designed to produce ransomware that pretends to come from law enforcement with the exact agency 
depending on the computer’s regional settings (“Lyposit Malware | win32/Lyposit.A,” n.d.). One version 
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created with Lyposit was known as Reveton.  It displayed a pop-up message saying the machine had been 
involved in child porn activity, downloading copyrighted material, or some other criminal activity, and had 
been locked by the FBI or Justice Department (Sjouwerman, 2015b; Savage, 2015). Another early 
ransomware was Trojan.Randsom.C. It spoofed a Windows Security Center message and asked the user to 
call a premium-rate phone number to reactivate their Windows license (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Deficiencies in locker ransomware, as well as other extortion schemes not discussed here, lead to a 
pivot back to crypto ransomware in 2013. A typical attack requests payment of around $300, and the attacks 
became much more capable (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015). 
2013. The most famous piece of ransomware, CyptoLocker, was released in August 2013 by a hacker 
named Slavik. It used public and private cryptographic keys to encrypt, and later decrypt, a victim’s files. 
It was originally distributed via the Gameover ZeuS banking Trojan botnet. Later, it was distributed via an 
email that appeared to come from UPS or FedEx (Zetter, 2015). The original version of CryptoLocker 
encrypted about 67 different file types, including all Microsoft Office data files (Cannell, 2016).
CyptoLocker gave victims three days to pay. Prices were around two Bitcoins, or $100 at that time. 
Other payment methods included CashU, Ukash, Paysafecard, and MoneyPak. With some versions, if the 
three-day deadline was not met, victims could pay a much higher ransom to retrieve their files. The amount 
varied with the version (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
In November, the value of the two Bitcoin ransom increased to about $460. Missing the original 
deadline raised the price to ten Bitcoins. By December, 250,000 machines were infected. It was found that 
41,928 Bitcoins of ransom had been paid (Sjouwerman, 2015b). In December, a copycat called Locker 
emerged. Its ransom was $150, with payment by Perfect Money or QIWI Visa Virtual Card number. Later 
in December, CryptoLocker 2.0 was released. It was written in a different language than CryptoLocker and 
so likely was released by different attackers (Sjouwerman, 2015b). During 2013, Symantec estimates that 
the number of attacks grew from 100,000 in January to 600,000 in December. They also estimated that three 
percent of infected users paid the ransom (Rosenberg, 2015).
2014. From September 2013 to May 2014, it is estimated that more than 500,000 victims were infected 
with CryptoLocker.  An estimated 1.3 percent of victims paid the ransom (Cannell, 2016).  In June, 
Operation Tovar, a coalition of law enforcement agencies, security vendors, and academics, took down the 
CryptoLocker distribution servers. Two vendors, FireEye and Fox-IT, found the database of decryption keys 
for all the CryptoLocker victims and released a service that allowed for free decryption by all victims 
(Cawley, 2016). In February, CryptoDefense was released. It was a fairly weak piece of ransomware, but 
still earned $34,000 in its first month. An improved version called CryptoWall was released in April. It used 
Java vulnerability and was delivered via malicious advertising. This version generated more than 
$1,000,000 in ransom (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
2015. By the end of 2015, the FBI estimated that victims had paid $27 million in ransoms to the 
attackers behind CryptoLocker (Cannell, 2016). CryptoWall passed Cryptolocker as the leading version of 
ransomware (Sjouwerman, 2015b).
A study by Kaspersky found that for 2014-2015, ransomware attacks increased by 17.7 percent but 
crypto ransomware attacks increased by 448 percent (Townsend, 2016). In May, ransomware-as-a-service 
arrived. Using a TOR website, attackers could create ransomware for free. The site handles payment and 
takes a 20 percent cut of the ransom (Sjouwerman, 2015b). In September, LockerPin was released. It infects 
Android systems and changes the PIN. It charges a $500 ransom. In October, a new report from the Cyber 
Threat Alliance reported total ransomware damage at $325,000,000 (Sjouwerman, 2015b).  In November, 
Linus.Encoder.1 was discovered by Dr.Web, a Russian computer security firm. As the name implies, it 
targets Linux systems. It encrypts both data files and files associated with web applications (Cawley, 2016).
In November, the fourth iteration of Cryptowall surfaced. It includes a modified protocol to help avoid 
detection. Additionally, it alters the file names when it encrypts files, making it harder to determine what 
files were actually encrypted (Pauli, 2015).
2016. In January, a JavaScript-only ransomware-as-a-service was discovered. Using JavaScript allows 
for a multi-platform attack, including Linus and MacOS X. In February, ransomware infected thousands of 
WordPress sites. WordPress is a popular blogging platform. In April, a ransomware called Petya came out. 
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Petya makes the whole hard disk inaccessible until the ransom is paid (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2016). It does 
this by overwriting the master boot record (MBR) of the infected computer. Without the MBR, the operating 
system cannot reconstruct the unencrypted files (Constantin, 2016). Apple had to release an update to block 
the KeRanger ransomware. KeRanger is believed to be the first ransomware attack targeting Apple 
computers. Once installed, KeRanger takes three days to activate and is designed to encrypt more than 300
file types (Kirk, 2016a).
In February, malware called Xbot was found to be targeting Android devices in Australia and Russia. 
Not only does it encrypt files, it also tries to steal online banking details (Kirk, 2016b). In July, the Locky 
ransomware added a failsafe mechanism that begins encrypting files even if the ransomware cannot request 
a unique encryption key from the criminals’ servers due to the target computer either being offline or 
blocking the communications (Constantin, 2016c).
The FBI estimates that ransomware generated $209,000,000 in the first three months of 2016 and is 
on track to be a one-billion-dollar crime this year (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2016).  During the first quarter, 
McAfee Labs measured 1.2 million ransomware attacks. This was a 24-percent increase over the fourth 
quarter of 2015 (McAfee Labs Threats Report, 2016). The three top versions currently in the wild are 
CryptoWall, CTB-Locker, and TorrentLocker. CryptoWall is an improved version of CryptoDefense. It not 
only encrypts files on the infected computer, but also targets any external storage or shared drives connected 
to the target. CTB-Locker is short for curve-Tor-Bitcoin. Both CryptoWall and CTB-Locker have affiliate 
sales programs. TorrentLocker harvests email addresses when it infects a computer in order to spam other 
users (Zetter 2015).
More Than Software is Required
Having ransomware software infect a machine is not enough. The ransomware must communicate with a 
server to get an encryption key and report its results. This requires a server hosted by a company that will 
ignore the illegal activity and guarantee the attackers anonymity. These hosting companies are called 
Bulletproof Hosting. Most are located in China or Russia. Attackers also use a proxy or VPN services to 
further disguise their own IP addresses (Segura, 2016).
Today, ransomware is a worldwide problem. Since different parts of the world have different abilities 
to pay, ransomware like CryptoWall uses dynamic geographical pricing. When a computer is infected, 
CryptoWall checks with its command-and-control (C&C) server. It reports the IP address of the infected 
computer. The C&C server checks a database and returns a price for the country associated with that IP 
address (Savage, 2015). 
Likewise, some criminals target businesses rather than individual users. Criminals know they can 
charge businesses a much higher ransom than individuals. While businesses rarely report infections and the 
ransom paid, there is some antidotal evidence. In 2012, several Australian businesses reported paying 
ransoms of up to AU$5,000 (US$4,750) and in 2015, a US online financial database received a demand of 
$50,000 (Savage, 2015). According to Liam O’Murchu, a security executive at antivirus software maker 
Symantec Corporation, the business attacks are focused on small businesses. Larger firms have more 
comprehensive backups, networks that are compartmentalized by departments and knowledgeable technical 
support personnel (Rosenberg, 2016). 
Researchers believe that criminals have found that about $10,000 is the optimal ransom for a business. 
It is low enough that businesses are willing to pay it and also low enough that law enforcement is reluctant 
to want to investigate it (Savage, 2015). For consumers, there is some good news. According to 
cybersecurity journalist Bob Sullivan, the ransoms seem to be dropping, with $300 being the more recent 
average price in the US. The criminals seem to be learning that lower ransoms make it much more likely 
that victims will pay (Wiles, 2016).
To Pay or not to Pay, That is the Question
Individuals and businesses face the decision whether to pay when they lack adequate backups to recover 
from the ransomware. As such, the decision boils down to two related questions. First, is the data worth 
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more than the ransom? And, if so, what is the level of confidence that the criminal will decrypt the data if 
the ransom is paid. Additionally, there is always the concern that paying the ransom will encourage the 
criminals. Given the statistic quoted above that the FBI believes ransomware will become a billion-dollar 
business in 2016, victims are clearly deciding to pay the ransom and take their chances.
Ransomware criminals seem to have enough business sense to realize that if word gets around that 
they do not deliver the decryption code once the ransom is paid; their business model will fail and victims 
will stop paying. Some ransomware schemes try to build trust by decrypting a few files before the ransom 
is paid. For example, Trojan.Cryptolocker.G has the option to decrypt five randomly chosen files for free. 
In other cases, business victims have been able to negotiate for a lower fee (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Nevertheless, in 2016, Kansas Heart Hospital paid the ransom when they were infected with an 
undisclosed ransomware. Rather than decrypting the files, the criminals demanded a second ransom, which 
the hospital refused to pay (Lemos, 2016). Trust is hard to build and easy to lose. It will not take many 
reports like this to strongly discourage businesses from paying the ransom if they are infected. In 2016, an 
Arkansas sheriff’s office paid $2,400 to recover their files (Press, 2016). Sometimes, it makes sense to 
negotiate before paying. In 2016, Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center was hit with ransomware that 
shut down their computers for more than a week. Rather than pay the initial $3.7 million ransom, the 
hospital went back to paper records until they were able to negotiate the payment down to 40 bitcoins or 
about $17,000 (Wolff, 2016).
Paying a ransom to get needed files back can make economic sense. Nevertheless, experts give four 
reasons not the pay the ransom. First, you become a bigger target. Criminals talk and tell each other who
paid and who did not. Second, as discussed above, you cannot trust criminals to decrypt your data. 
CryptoWall has a reputation for excellent “customer service.” Other malware families do not. Third, your 
next ransom will be higher. Perhaps the criminals demand a second ransom before decrypting your data or 
perhaps you are infected a second time. Either way, you will pay more. Fourth, your payment encourages 
the criminals to continue doing what they are doing (Rashid, 2016).
Data on Infection
According to Osterman Research, Inc., from June 2015 to June 2016, 59 percent of ransomware infections 
came via email, either as a link or an attachment. Another 24 percent came via a website or web application. 
Another eight percent came by social media, USB stick, or business application, and nine percent were of 
unknown origin. Once infected, only three percent of US companies pay the ransom, while 75 percent of 
Canadian companies pay (State of Ransomware, 2016). Symantec uses telemetry data to track ransomware 
infections by country. The rankings are shown in the table 1 below. For the most part, criminals are targeting 
large or affluent countries (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Table 1
Top 12 Countries Impacted by Ransomware
Rank Country
1 USA
2 Japan
3 UK
4 Italy
5 Germany
6 Russia
7 Canada
8 Australia
9 India
10 Netherlands
11 Brazil
12 Turkey
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Over the past 12 months, 64 percent of ransomware attacks have been crypto ransomware, while 36 percent 
has been locker ransomware. This is in line with the past several years (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
Emerging Trends in Ransomware
Law enforcement and computer security vendors, like Symantec, are starting to pay attention to ransomware. 
This has forced the criminals to change the way they operate. More are using Tor and the Invisible Internet 
Project (I2P) to hide their tracks. Likewise, more are turning to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to hide the 
money trail. As the pressure on ransomware increases, the criminals will likely look for more ways to block 
and obfuscate attempts to track and understand their activities (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).
At first, ransomware was mainly a problem for the Windows platform. However, as discussed earlier, 
it has begun to move to Apple and Android systems. That trend is likely to continue. Researchers have 
written ransomware that can attack a smart thermostat (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2016).  Already, locker 
ransomware that attacks smart watches has been seen in the wild. As the world moves to the Internet of 
Things (IoT), there is no doubt that ransomware will move to the IoT as well. While that might seem 
farfetched at first, researchers have already been able to take over the computer systems of a moving Jeep 
Cherokee. If researchers can do it, so can ransomware (Savage, Coogan, & Lau, 2015).  At that point, the 
cost may not be money but your life.
The big money is to be made attacking businesses, and so far, crypto ransomware is a low-risk, high-
yield endeavor with little to no fear of law enforcement prosecuting criminals in the rare event the infection 
is reported—and most infections go unreported. Companies do not report because they do not want to make 
things worse or become targets for other criminals (Gallagher, 2016).
From June 2015 to June 2016, according to a survey by Osterman Research, Inc., 79 percent of business 
organizations in the US suffered at least one ransomware attack and 22 percent suffered more than twenty. 
In these attacks, 78 percent reported that people were impacted, 12 percent reported the business stopped 
immediately, 11 percent reported that employees had to use personal equipment while corporate systems 
were down, and six percent lost revenue as a result. The top four industries attacked were healthcare, 
financial services, manufacturing, and governmental (State of Ransomware, 2016).
Currently, most ransomware quickly announces that it has encrypted data files in order to quickly 
collect the ransom. Some ransomware is moving to delayed announcements, all the while encrypting files 
in the background. That allows the encrypted files to quietly overwrite good files in backups, making it 
harder to recover from the ransomware using backups (Pauli, 2015).  It is also becoming more common for 
ransomware to threaten to release files publically unless the ransom is paid. According to FireEye, one 
company paid over one million dollars to prevent sensitive data from being released. This has real potential 
for both cost and embarrassment. Consider a company that has emails from its general council compromised 
as part of a ransomware attack (Kirk, 2016c).
Criminals are also looking for alternative attack vectors. In late 2016, they begin using SVG (scalable 
vector graphics) files on social media as an attack method. SVG files allow computer code, such as 
JavaScript, to be embedded in the graphic. That code can be opened and executed via a browser (Rosenquist, 
2016).  In late 2016, the Locky malware was being prorogated via a Word macro (Gallagher, 2016c).  One 
version of Popcorn Time allowed users to decrypt their files for free if they infected two other people with 
the ransomware (Abrams, 2016).
Ransomware are trending to become both localized and targeted at businesses, which can afford to pay 
the ransom and where the files are more critical. Researchers have found that most ransomware links are 
clicked on between 9am and 1pm: typical work hours. The criminals are adding detection evasion 
techniques, including CAPTCHA tests and versions that self-destruct (Constantin, 2015). Certainly, it 
seems likely that countries and other threat actors are looking at ransomware as a potential weapon. This 
was seen publicly when the North Koreans attacked Sony Pictures.
Preventing Ransomware
Experts have four recommendations for individuals and businesses trying to prevent a ransomware infection 
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and for dealing with the infection if it happens:
Step 1: Back Up. If the data is backed up, there is no need to pay a ransom to get the data back. Instead, 
it can be recovered from the backups (Zetter, 2016).  Of course, the backups need to be current. Some 
ransomware attempts to encrypt locally connected backup systems, so either uses a cloud backup or a 
system that is only connected while the backup is being made. It is also important to keep multiple backups. 
As discussed above, ransomware is starting to delay announcing itself. It encrypts files in the background, 
and those encrypted files are then placed in the current backup, preventing that backup from being used to 
restore unencrypted files.
Step 2: Avoid Email Links and Attachments. Phishing attacks are the most common way to spread 
ransomware, so avoiding clicking on links or opening attachments in spam email will go a long way to 
avoiding ransomware. However, criminals have also started using compromised advertising (malvertising) 
to spread ransomware. These can target trusted websites. Ad blockers can protect against malvertising 
(Zetter, 2016).  Turning off Java and JavaScript can also help. Business should train employees to avoid 
suspicious email, and corporate IT should consider standardizing ad blocking software.
According to a report by PhishMe, in March 2016, 93 percent of all phishing emails contained crypto 
ransomware. That is up from 56 percent in December 2015. PhishMe also estimates that 6.3 million 
phishing emails were sent in the first quarter of 2016 (Korolov, 2016). In addition to standard phishing, 
PhishMe is seeing an increase in targeted phishing emails. For example, the phishing email might contain 
what it claims to be a resume. Most recipients would either ignore it or forward it to HR, while an HR 
recipient might open it without thinking about it. Other categories are billing-, shipping-, and invoice-
related phishing emails (Korolov, 2016).
Individual users can avoid most malicious email attachments by forwarding their email through Gmail, 
which does an excellent job of blocking suspect attachments. Corporate users can use application 
whitelisting, but that is not currently available for individual users (Bradley, 2015).
Step 3: Patch and Block. The operating system, browsers, and security software should always be 
kept patched and up-to-date. Likewise, third-party plug-ins, like Java and Flash, need to be kept patched if 
they are allowed at all. Business systems can also rely on whitelisting and limiting user rights to reduce the 
chance of a ransomware infection (Zetter, 2016).  Of course, these steps will help reduce other types of 
malware infections as well. Unfortunately, ransomware is constantly evolving to stay ahead of antivirus 
software, so software alone cannot be depended on to block an attack (Rosenberg, 2015).
Step 4: Drop-and-Roll. At the first sign of an infection, the infected machine should be immediately 
turned off (or unplugged) to minimize the damage to files. If it is connected to a network, administrators 
should immediately shut down the network to minimize the propagation of the ransomware (Zetter, 2016).  
More on dealing with an infection is discussed below. The above applies to both individuals and 
organizations. For organizations, experts recommend the following best practices:
Understand the Risks. As this paper makes clear, ransomware is a very real danger to both data and 
the ability of the organization to continue operations and that danger is growing at an accelerating rate. 
Organizations cannot make good decisions regarding prevention and training expenditures without 
understanding the full extent of the threat that ransomware makes to the organization.
Develop Adequate Policies. Devices not owned by the organization are often connected to the 
organization’s network. These would include, for example, cell phones and tablets owned by employees. 
This is sometimes called “shadow IT.” Ransomware policies, protection, and response procedures need to 
include the entire network, including shadow IT (Best Practices, 2016).
Institute Best Practices for Users. These would include appropriate password management, ongoing 
security awareness training, backchannels for key employees dealing with finances or sensitive so requests 
for funds transfers can be double-checked, periodic testing of employees to make sure the training is 
effective, an appropriate social media policy, and making sure employees keep the software on their 
personal devices up-to-date (Best Practices, 2016).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation also recommends the following: make sure employees understand 
their role in protecting against ransomware, manage the use of privileged accounts so that work gets 
accomplished at the lowest privilege level possible, configure access controls, including file, directory, and 
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network share permissions appropriately, disable macro scripts, and implement software restriction policies 
or other controls to prevent ransomware from executing from commonly used locations (“Incidents of 
Ransomware on the rise,” 2016).
Dealing with an Infected Machine
Dealing with ransomware is expensive; even if you have your data backed up and do not have to pay the 
ransom. According to the Cyber Threat Alliance, in eighteen months since CryptoWall in January 2015, 
victims have suffered $325 million in damages. This includes mainly restoring data from backups and 
purging systems of the ransomware, a process that can take days or weeks, during which the business may 
have limited abilities to operate (Zetter, 2016).
Ransomware does not destroy data. Rather, it locks up the data until a ransom is paid. Even if the 
ransomware infection is removed, the data remains encrypted (Bradley, 2015).  While many versions of 
ransomware encrypt files in such a way that no recovery is possible without paying the ransom, many more 
versions have flaws that allow files to be recovered without paying a ransom. Often, the warning screen for 
crypto ransomware will give the name of the ransomware, which can serve as a starting point for research.
Antivirus company AVG recommends the following steps:
Step 1: Run a full scan of the infected computer to find out the ransomware used.
Step 2: Copy the encrypted files to a USB drive so they can be decrypted on an uninfected computer. 
This also leaves the targeted computer in its infected state in case there is a need to pay the ransom to 
decrypt the files.
Step 3: Use a tool to decrypt the files on the USB drive. AVG provides free tools for decrypting six 
ransomware strains: Apocalypse, BadBlcok, Crypt888, Legion, SZFLocker, and TeslaCrypt (Buckingham, 
2016).
Whether a tool is used to recover files, the files are recovered from a backup, or the ransom is paid, 
the ransomware software must be removed from the computer. Experts recommend that the data files be 
copied off the computer and then the hard drive reformatted and the operating system and files reinstalled 
fresh (Rosenberg, 2015).
Concise Concluding Inferences
Ransomware has become one of the most urgent problems in the digital world. The frequent attacks and 
the news they generate have shattered the illusion that firms have frequent backups and do an excellent job 
of protecting their digital resources. Clearly, protecting oneself from ransomware is hard. If firms find it 
challenging, what chance to individual users have of protecting themselves? And all of this is happening as 
both firms and individuals move more and more of their data, and lives, online. Unlike a mugger or burglar, 
these attackers are typically shadowy figures from other countries that have weak or nonexistent law 
enforcement, making it unlikely that law enforcement is going to make much of a dent in the wave of 
ransomware.
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